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DEjANA VukASOVIć
EuROpEAN uNION AND OThERNESS: 
 ThE CASE OF BALkANS
L’enfer, c’est les autres.
Jean-Paul Sartre
A b s t r a c t
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relation between the 
EU and the Balkans in the process of othering. The main re-
search question raised here is in what way and to what ex-
tent the Balkans as Other was used in the process of the EU 
identity construction. The EU is perceived as a discursive self-
construction establishing its own distinct identity against Oth-
ers. It is thus argued that the Balkans identity has been dis-
cursively constructed in opposition to the EU identity. Through 
the discursive process, by virtue of asymmetry of power, the 
EU self-constructed its identity by stigmatizing the difference 
of the Balkans — Other. The paper starts with the clarifica-
tion of some conceptual premises concerning Self, Other and 
the concept of Otherness. It then focuses on the Balkans as 
Other in the process of EU identity construction. Finally, the 
Western Balkans as Other is also examined in the process of 
othering. Due to the asymmetry of power in the EU — Self 
and Balkans/Western Balkans—Other relation and the ability 
of the EU to impose the constructed dominant representa-
tions, this relation is about inclusion and exclusion, superiority 
and inferiority.
K e y  w o r d s: Self; Other; otherness; European Union; Bal-
kans; Western Balkan
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uNIA EuROpEjSkA A INNOść. pRzypADEk BAłkANów
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu przeanalizowanie relacji pomiędzy Unią Europejską a Bałkanami w proce-
sie stwarzania inności. Zadając główne pytanie badawcze, autorka docieka, w jaki sposób i jak dalece 
Bałkany jako Inny zostały wykorzystane dla budowania tożsamości Unii Europejskiej. Unia postrze-
gana jest jako dyskursywna autokonstrukcja ustanawiająca własną odrębną tożsamość w relacji do 
Innych. Zatem można dowodzić, że tożsamość bałkańska jest konstruowana dyskursywnie w opozy-
cji do tożsamości unijnej. W tym dyskursywnym procesie, wobec asymetrii władzy, UE sama stwo-
rzyła swoją tożsamość poprzez stygmatyzowanie różnicy Bałkany – Inny. Artykuł najpierw objaśnia 
niektóre założenia pojęciowe odnoszące się do „Ja” i „Innego” oraz pojęcie „Inności”. Następnie 
koncentruje się na Bałkanach jako Innym w procesie konstruowania tożsamości UE. Wreszcie analiza 
obejmuje Bałkany Zachodnie jako Innego w procesie powstawania inności. W obliczu asymetrii w re-
lacji Unia Europejska jako JA -- Bałkany/Bałkany Zachodnie jako Inny oraz faktu, że UE ma możność 
narzucenia skonstruowanych dominujących wyobrażeń, relacja ta obejmuje włączenie i wykluczenie, 
nadrzędność i podrzędność. [Transl. by Jacek Serwański]
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: JA; Inny; inność; Unia Europejska; Bałkany; Bałkany Zachodnie
SELF, OThER AND OThERNESS
The concept of other is an integral part of identity formation. Identity is a two-faced phenomenon, simultaneously implying similarity and difference. (Jenkins, 2008, p. 17) On the one hand, identity involves the need for belonging, since identities 
arise as a product of social interaction. On the other, identity appears as an answer in re-
lation to the other, and hence implies the difference vis-à-vis the other. We cannot define 
ourselves unless we differentiate ourselves from what is not “us” (other) and vice versa, 
we can only define and comprehend what the other is if we place it in relation to “us”. 
Therefore, self-identity is fundamentally linked to the other. How can othering then be 
conceptualized? Othering is understood as a process of producing otherness, “as under-
standing and interacting with the other so as to differentiate and distance oneself from 
that other, with the other being an individual or a group that the self has ideas about and 
possibly a relation with”. (Reinke de Buitrago, 2015, pp. 87–88)
What kind of differentiation and distance do we mean in the process of othering? 
According to some authors, difference does not a priori imply something bad, i.e. does 
not necessarily have a negative connotation like exclusion, aversion, enmity, etc. (Delanty, 
1995; Diez, 2005; Hall, 1997; Neumann & Welsh, 1991) As Gerard Delanty claims, “what 
matters is not the representation of the Other as such but the actual nature of the diffe-
rence that is constructed.” (Delanty, 1995, p. 5) This difference can thus take on a “pat-
hological form”, when the difference is based on the negation of other, i.e. the defining 
characteristic of the group is not its commonness but separateness from other groups. 
The concept of other therefore represents a choice between the recognition of otherness 
which implies diversity, or its negation, which implies division. (Delanty, 1995, p. 5)
Central to the construction of otherness is hierarchy, i.e. asymmetry of power in the 
self—other relation. Otherness in that sense represents “the result of a discursive pro-
cess by which a dominant in group (the Self) constructs one or many out groups (Other) 
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by stigmatizing a difference—real or imagined—presented as a negation of identity and 
thus a motive for potential discrimination”. (Staszak, 2009, p. 43) Otherness is about a 
“pathological form” of difference, to use Delanty’s wording, i.e. while difference is inhe-
rent to identity formation, otherness belongs to the realm of discourse. Discourse, as a 
“system of representation”, is a particular kind of knowledge about the topic. (Hall, 1992, 
p. 201) It enables to represent things which are very differentiated as homogeneous. (EU, 
West, East, Balkans) Discourse is about power, because power and knowledge directly 
imply one another. (Hall, 1992, p. 203) In this regard, discourse makes it possible to con-
struct the Other in a certain way by the Self and at the same time limits other ways in 
which the Other can be constructed. The power of discourse depends on its ability to im-
pose its categories, and is related not only to the political and economic power of those 
delivering it but also to the power to represent someone or something in a certain way, 
i.e. on the exercise of symbolic power through representational practices. (Hall, 1997, 
p. 259) In the discursive process, the Self imposes the values of its particularity, i.e. its 
identity as the only valid, “normal”, “real” and, at the same time, devalues the particula-
rity of Other. (Staszak, 2009, p. 43) The Other is constructed in opposition to the superior 
Self and thus can be easily described in pejorative terms, in simplistic and stigmatizing 
stereotypes. As a consequence, the Other is symbolically placed on the “periphery”, it is 
marginalized and stigmatized.
In the field of international relations, the EU is engaged in the process of othering. 
Thus, the different Others are necessary in order to define/redefine and manifest the 
EU’s identity. (Neumann, 1999) The EU’s identity construction involves establishing op-
posites and otherness, especially in the situation when being European “lacks a clearly 
defined set of markers”. (Delanty & Rumford, 2005, p. 11) In this paper, the EU as an 
international actor is viewed as a discursive self-construction which establishes a particu-
lar identity against Others. (cf. Diez, 2005; Neumann & Welsh, 1991) This particular EU 
identity is represented as a “normative power” with the ability to shape the conceptions 
of “normal” in international relations. In this regard, the EU represents a construct which 
denotes not only the EU as a specific kind of actor in international politics, but also deter-
mines the nature of the relationship the EU has with Others. The discourse of the EU as 
a normative power constructs a particular self of the EU and attempts to change others 
through the spread of particular norms (Diez, 2005, p. 614). The particular EU identity is 
achieved through the inscription of boundaries serving to demarcate an “inside” from 
an “outside”, a “domestic” from a “foreign”, i.e. is based on the inclusion and exclu-
sion. The power of the EU-Self determines the representations and knowledge about the 
Other, and forces Other into respecting the EU-Self. 
The main research question posed in this paper is in what way and to what extent the 
Balkans was used for the construction of the EU identity in the process of othering. In 
this paper, the “Balkans” is viewed as a “discursively constructed, controlled, isolated 
and stigmatizing” Other. (Koprivitsa, 2013, p. 26) The use of the Balkans as the Other ex-
ceeds the neutral (geographic) description of the region, transforming it into the category 
of “symbolic geography” in which “mental mapping” is more important than “physical 
maps”. (Subotić, 2007, p. 10) In this regard, Balkans ceases to denote a geographical 
territory and encloses a metaphorical meaning. The terms “inferior” and “existential thre-
at” are in this paper borrowed from the typology of othering presented by Thomas Diez. 
He distinguishes four types of othering in international politics that are linked to the EU 
identity: representation of the Other as an existential threat, as inferior, as violating uni-
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versal principles and as different. (Diez, 2005, p. 628) The terms “existential threat” and 
“inferior Other” are used to denote the historically variable modes of domination of the 
EU Self vis-à-vis the Balkans as well as the Western Balkans.
ThE BALkANS AS INFERIOR OThER AND AS EXISTENTIAL ThREAT
Andrew Hammond notes that the Balkans is the expression of one of the most powerful 
representational traditions in European culture. (Hammond, 2006, p. 8) The region was 
nameless for centuries.1 Being divided between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empire it 
was usually associated with the name “European part of Turkey” or “Turkey in Europe”. 
(Simić, 2013, p. 115) The Balkans was sporadically referred to by this name until the late 
19th century, when it became widely accepted, mostly in relation to the newly created 
states within the region. The specificity of the region, reflected in the fact that it was 
a successor of the Byzantine Empire, part of the European continent that had for centu-
ries been under the rule of an oriental power, led to the representation of the Balkans as 
a region that stood in opposition to the Western European civilization, a place that did not 
belong to Europe, but rather was some sort of place of “aliens”. How did this dichotomy 
Europe/Balkans emerge? How do we know all that we know about the Balkans?
Western representations of the Balkans stemmed from the western discourse studies 
in the late 18th century. (Todorova, 2009) The “discovering” of the Balkans consisted ma-
inly of travelogues, journalist accounts and occasional history books. (Bjelić, 2002; Laza-
rević-Radak, 2013) In the 19th century, the region was described as a “wild”, “primitive”, 
“strange”, “backward”, characterized by “diabolical mountains” and inhabited by “infe-
rior nationalities”. (Hammond, 2006, p. 8) This “ugliness” of the Balkans gradually beca-
me the conceptual force of the presentation of the region vis-à-vis the “self-beautifica-
tion” of Western Europe. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of 20th century, 
especially after the Balkan wars (1912-1913) and World War I, the discursively construc-
ted differences between “Europe” and the Balkans become crystallized in the Western 
European consciousness. The image of the Balkans emerged as an opposition or negati-
ve reflection of the “positive” Western Europe. The dominant discourse on the Balkans 
represented the Balkans as primitive, backward, tribal, barbarian (Todorova, 2009, p. 3), or 
namely in terms of the hierarchical discourse of superiority and inferiority.
The tendency to define the West as superior relative to different inferior Others was 
outlined by many scholars. (Bjelić, 2002; Hall, 1992; Jaskulowski, 2010; Said, 1978; Wolff, 
1994) Its roots can be traced to the period of Enlightenment in a form of highly idealized 
image of the West, including positive virtues of rationality, progress, civilization, humani-
ty, etc. (Jaskulowski, 2010, p. 298) Through the process of imagining and representation 
of the Other as inferior, the identity of the “West” and “Europe” has been constructed 
as a superior, “civilized” Self. In that sense, the Others have “helped to define Europe (or 
the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience”. (Said, 1978, pp. 1–2) 
Edward Said’s Orientalism set up the conceptual foundations for the understanding of the 
Western discourse of Self and Other. The concept of “orientalism” represented a “style 
of thought” based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between “Occident” 
and “Orient”, a set of discursive practices through which the “Occident” was able to 
1 The name Balkan peninsula was first put in official use by the German philosopher Johan Zeune (1808).
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dominate, structure and exercise authority over the “Orient”. (Said, 1978, p. 3) By virtue 
of this style of thought, the Occident produced the image of the Orient as inferior, threa-
tening, underdeveloped Other.2
In this regard, the specific rhetoric on the Balkans could be regarded as a “variation on 
the orientalist theme”. (Bakić-Hayden & Hayden, 1992) Jacques Le Rider is explicit in this 
regard: “European discourses on “the Balkans” belong to a form of Orientalism deprived 
of any positive features, to a cultural colonialism which expects from Occidental culture 
that it should restore some order and rationality to fragmented and underdeveloped terri-
tories”. (Le Rider, 2008, p. 157) In this regard, the Balkans as European Other has been 
the result of a discursive process by which Western Europe constructed the Balkans by 
stigmatizing its differences, i.e. by presenting these differences as a negation of Western 
European identity. Therefore, the Balkans’ features, identity and geographic boundaries 
were “made” as such by the West. In this respect, Balkanism, as a coherent body of 
knowledge was, like Orientalism, organized around the binaries of superior/inferior, ra-
tional/irrational, civilization/barbarism, center/periphery. (Bjelić, 2002, p. 3) Moreover, the 
negative characteristics of the Balkans were represented as inherent to the region and 
therefore have had a tendency to be essentialized. (Bakić-Hayden, 1995, p. 918) By po-
wer of discourse, even in the absence of a literal colonial presence in the Balkans, the re-
gion could be seen as unconventionally colonized with the “imperialism of imagination”. 
(Goldsworthy, 1998, pp. 2–3)
Some authors, however, consider that this role of the Balkans as an object of alterity 
was not so clear and therefore was more complex that the one of the Orient. Andrew 
Hammond claims that this region is mostly represented as unstable and unsettling, as an 
“obscure boundary where categories, oppositions and essentialized groupings are cast 
into confusion”. (Hammond, 2007, p. 204) In a similar vein, Maria Todorova considered 
the Balkan region as an ambiguous Europe’s semi-Other, which is reflected in its “histori-
cal and geographical concreteness” in opposition to the “intangible nature of the Orient”. 
(Todorova, 2009, p. 11) She outlined the liminal position of the Balkans as a characteristic 
of the region that is at the same time part of Europe but also its periphery, the “other” 
within. By introducing the term Balkanism as a “discourse about an imputed ambiguity”, 
she pointed out to the specificity of the Balkans in the process of othering in comparison 
to Orientalism, which represents a “discourse about an imputed opposition”. (Todorova, 
2009, p. 17) The same trace can be found in Larry Wolff’s Inventing Eastern Europe, when 
he speaks about Eastern Europe as a region not as an absolute opposition to the West 
but as an ambiguity and contrast to Europe, “as a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and 
exclusion, Europe but not Europe”. (Wolff, 1994, p. 7) Due to this specificity, the Balkans 
remained neither here nor there (Bjelić, 2002), Europe but not Europe, the Europe’s inter-
nal Other within, the dark side of Europe, where all the unacceptable characteristics of the 
“civilized” West have to be pushed down. (Lazarević-Radak, 2016, p. 108)
During the Cold War, European integration had become synonym for Western Euro-
pean integration. The end of the Cold War and the creation of the EU as a new political 
actor warranted a search for the new EU identity which unfolded hand in hand with the 
2 Inspired by Said‘s work, Larry Wolff wrote that the Western perceptions of “Western” and “Eastern” 
Europe originated as mental constructs, as discursive constructions: “It was Western Europe that invented 
Eastern Europe as its complementary other half in the eighteenth century, the age of Enlightenment. It was 
also the Enlightenment, with its intellectual centers in Western Europe, that cultivated and appropriated 
to itself the new notion of “civilization“, an eighteenth-century neologism; and civilization discovered its 
complement, within the same continent, in shadowed lands of backwardness, even barbarism (located in 
so-called “Eastern Europe“) (Wolff, 1994, p. 4).
Page 6 of 12
redefinition of the EU’s Others. The newly signed EU Maastricht Treaty underscored the 
goal of “reinforcing European identity and its independence in order to promote security 
and progress in Europe and in the world” (preamble). In the new circumstances, followed 
by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Western repre-
sentations of the Balkans as the inferior Other were revived. In the Western discourse, 
the Balkans became the “danger evil” (Kaplan, 1993, p. XXI)3, the “horror of ethnic clean-
sing”, the “virus of aggressive nationalism” (Gutman, 1993, p. 175)4, the dangerous, vio-
lent and even “contentious” area. (Hatzopoulos, 2008) Moreover, civil war in Yugoslavia 
was equated with the whole region of the Balkans. (Hatzopoulos, 2008; Todorova, 2009) 
In The Other Balkan wars (1993), the reprint of the Report of the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace on the Balkan Wars from 1914, the breakup of Yugoslavia was 
explained by the “ancient hatreds” in the Balkans that were deeply rooted not only in 
the present but also in the past. (quoted in Simić, 2013, p. 123)5 The main feature of this 
“new Balkan war” was “aggressive nationalism” that “drew on deeper traits of character 
inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past”. (quoted in Hatzopoulos, 2008, p. 46) 
In this new representation, the Balkans become an existential threat for the EU and the 
whole Europe.
How was the new EU identity constructed vis-à-vis these discourses representing the 
Balkans as a danger, as an existential threat? Not long after the dismantling of the Soviet 
Union, in a speech before the European Parliament, Jacques Poos, who held presidency 
of the Council of the EU, declared that “Europe has at last been restored to its natural 
unity”. (quoted in Luoma-Aho, 2002, p. 126)6 This statement was soon followed by va-
rious statements by EC/EU representatives portraying the process of dissolution of Yu-
goslavia and the civil war which ensued as a threat affecting the stability of Europe as a 
whole.7 The “aggressive nationalism” in the Balkans became an existential threat for the 
EU and the whole Europe. Being “qualitatively different” from the nationalism in Western 
Europe, the nationalism emerging in Eastern Europe in general was qualified as “radical 
and dangerously irrational”, with the capability to “transform benign ethnicity to a bellige-
rent political ideology” connected with totalitarianism and xenophobia. (Brzezinski, 1989, 
p. 16) Thus, the conceptualization of nationalism in Yugoslavia in more or less explicitly 
pathological terms (malignant, aggressive, ugly hyper-nationalism, extreme, xenophobic, 
etc.) enabled the construction of the EU identity as a new kind of power in international 
politics in opposition to the “danger” of the Balkans.
The EU identity was constructed by means of a spatio-temporal narrative—“Europe 
whole and free”: “freedom and democracy took great leaps forward both inside and out-
side Europe, although history did not quite end as some predicted. The dream of “Euro-
3 In Balkan Ghosts Robert Kaplan writes about “the danger evil” coming from the Balkans. He underlines 
that “the Balkans produced the century’s first terrorists”, that the “nazism can claim Balkan origins” and 
asks himself if there is “a bad smell, a genius loci, something about the landscape that might incriminate” 
(Kaplan, 1993, p. XXI).
4 In A witness to Genocide, Roy Gutman underlined the brutality of the Balkan social life, the “horrors of eth-
nic cleansing”, the “virus of aggressive nationalism” whose “long-suppressed forces have been unleashed 
once more in the present” (Gutman, 1993, p. 175).
5 The Other Balkan wars included a new introduction written by the American diplomat George Kennan.
6  Pierre Bourdieu pointed out that “every established order tends to produce (...) the naturalization of its own 
arbitrariness” (quoted in Bakić-Hayden & Hayden, 1992, p. 3).
7 In August 1991, the Declaration on Yugoslavia stated a strong interest for the peaceful resolution of the 
Yugoslav conflict, “not only for the sake of Yugoslavia itself and its constituent peoples, but for Europe 
as a whole“—Declaration on Yugoslavia, European Political Cooperation Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, 
Brussels, 27 August 1991. Also, in 1993, during the Danish EU presidency, it was stated that the conflict 
was “taking place in Europe, and we measure it by the same yardstick as we would a similar development 
at home in our own countries“—European Council Meeting, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993.
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pe whole and free” suddenly seemed to be a realistic perspective”. (Rehn, 2008, p. 2) 
On the one hand, the EU was represented as responsible for the future of the entire 
European continent, and on the other, the EU was portrayed as an actor responsible for 
the peaceful integration of all countries of the European continent. In this image of the 
EU as a “rescuer”, with its mission civilisatrice and pacifiste, the Balkans, as Europe’s 
“backyard”8, occupied a particular position as the EU’s Other. The Balkans was the incar-
nation of the violent fragmentation of the past versus the EC/EU which represented the 
peaceful integration of the future. The EU was discursively constructed as a “rescuer” 
that will “heal” the “aggressive nationalism” in the Balkans with the “integration the-
rapy”. From the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia, European leaders repeated that the 
events in Yugoslavia should and must be managed and solved only by the EC/EU. Accor-
ding to Jacques Poos, it was “the hour of Europe—not the hour of the Americans” to 
solve “the Yugoslav problem”. EC/EU’s main strategy was to contain the conflict while 
preventing its cross-border consequences. The failure of the EC/EU to “Europeanize” the 
Balkans was transformed into a narrative on the “immaturity” of the EU as a political 
actor. As the then president of the European Commission Jacques Delors declared, “the 
Community is like an adolescent facing the crisis of adulthood. If the Community were 10 
years older there would have been an intervention force”. (quoted in Luoma-Aho, 2002, 
p. 139) Thus, the failure of the EC/EU in Yugoslavia was transformed into the discourse 
on the necessity of political maturity of the EU, which will be capable to take a “full” 
responsibility in its “backyard”, including collective military action if necessary. The mate-
rialization of this discourse was reflected in the progressive development of the EU enlar-
gement policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy (including CSDP):
The EU has progressively extended its zone of peace and democracy across the European 
continent (...) Enlargement is a matter of extending the zone of European values, the most 
fundamental of which are liberty and solidarity, tolerance and human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law. (Rehn, 2005, p. 1)
Thus, the EU enlargement policy symbolized EU as a “normal” entity which stands for 
liberal values, democracy, free trade, “particularism” of European culture and civilization. 
It enabled to represent its main elements, i.e. promotion of democracy, market economy, 
good governance, protection of human rights as solely valid. As a powerful Self, the EU 
set the conditions for membership by imposing its internal principles and values as un-
questionable and of universal validity. By the process of integration, the EU gradually be-
came the personification of “Europe” and the framing of the European identity became 
the framing of the Eu identity through the power of inclusion and exclusion, i.e. by the 
inscription of boundaries in order to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside”, or “dome-
stic” from “foreign”:
Inside the borders of the European Union we have achieved an era of deep peace, based on 
law and institutions. In its domestic life, the European Union is a very concrete application 
of the idea of a peaceful system of international relations outlined in the classic essay of Im-
manuel Kant on perpetual peace, which imagined a brotherhood of republican democracies 
which never go to war against one other. But outside the EU’s borders, even in our immedia-
te neighborhood to the South East and East, there is no such perpetual peace. It may not be 
an outright Hobbesian world where the law of the jungle and the survival of the fittest prevail-
at least if we bypass the Balkan wars of the 1990s. (Rehn, 2008, pp. 4–5)
8 In 1992, The New york Times wrote that “the blood of the Balkans is seeping under the European door” 
(quoted in Goldsworthy, 1998, pp. 8–9).
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In this process of EU maturity, the “ghettoization” of the Balkans occurred. (Todoro-
va, 2009, p. 191) Instead of failed attempt to “Europeanize” the Balkans, conflicts in the 
region threatened to “balkanize” EU and brought NATO and USA back on the European 
stage. (Simić, 2001, p. 22) Thus, two spaces have been discursively constructed, one 
that was democratic, peaceful and secure and the other that was dangerous, threatened 
and authoritarian. By constructing the Balkans as a “degraded ghetto”, the EU displaced 
this region into the periphery, excluding it from the “united Europe”. By the inclusion/
exclusion binary, the cohesion within the EU (“inside”) was rendered possible, and at the 
same time the differentiation to the opposite Balkans (“outside”).The symbolic spatial 
bordering enabled the constitution of the EU’s normative order (“domestic”) as a place of 
governance and upholding of the EU values, in opposition to the “threatening stranger” 
that violated these values (“foreign”):
Borders limit our minds and reduce our influence. Frontiers open new avenues and increase 
our influence. Frontiers are much more substantive, functional and innovative—even men-
tal—than geographical (...) EU is defined by its values more than by sheer geography, espe-
cially in the East and Southeast (Rehn, 2006).
On the other hand, as the stigmatized Other, the Balkans was confronted with a ne-
gative image during the civil war in Yugoslavia. The incapacity to conceive itself in other 
terms than from the point of view of the dominating other led to the internalization of the 
negative representations in the process of self-identification. While accepting the featu-
res of the stigmatized Other, the countries of the region became part of the stigma-dele-
gating process within the region. This process of “nesting orientalisms” (Bakić-Hayden, 
1995) therefore emerged at first as the expression of discursively constructed differen-
ces among the former Yugoslav countries, but also spread to other countries of the re-
gion. In that sense, the Balkans became a “repository” of discursive patterns available 
to the countries of the region marked with the EU stigma to produce the discourse of 
otherness through the dichotomy Europeanness/Balkanness. (cf. Petrović, 2013, p. 115)
wESTERN BALkANS AS INFERIOR OThER
“Any identity is ‘ultimately’ doomed to give up the ghost”. (Neumann, 1999, p. 213) 
The narratives that uphold a certain identity are not eternal. They must be credible and 
constantly reformulated to fit new situations affecting the Self. (Neumann, 1999, pp. 
218–219) Therefore, the “triumph of integration” enables the EU to categorize the Bal-
kans in a more “benign” manner, by portraying itself as “exceptional” and as example to 
be followed by others:
Enlargement has been a success story for the European Union and Europe as a whole. It has 
helped to overcome the division of Europe and contributed to peace and stability throughout 
the continent. It has inspired reforms and has consolidated common principles of liberty, de-
mocracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as well as 
the market economy. (European Council, 2006, p. 2)
In a similar vein, in a speech before European Parliament, the president of the Europe-
an Commission Jean-Claude Junker declared:
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If we had not done what we did in the last few decades, if we had not made Europe a pea-
ceful continent, if we had not reconciled European history and geography, if we had not set 
up the single currency and if we had not established the world’s largest internal market in 
Europe, where would we be now? We would be nobodies, we would be weak, we would be 
defenceless (...) I want a Europe at the heart of the action, a Europe which moves forward, 
a Europe which exists, protects, wins and serves as a model for others. (Junker, 2014, p. 8) 
Thus, as the Other that violated the universal principles of the EU, and therefore stigma-
tized and isolated, the Balkans “should be convinced or otherwise brought to accept the 
principles of the Self”, i.e. EU. (cf. Diez, 2005, p. 628) From 1996 onwards, by inclusion of 
the Balkans in the Regional approach, the EU aimed to transform the Balkans in a “Euro-
pean manner” within the framework of regional cooperation and integration. This process 
included the reconstruction of the Balkans identity in a “western” manner, no longer as 
a region with a negative (and occasionally threatening) connotation, an antipode to “Europe-
an values”. The term “Balkans” has been associated with violence, barbarism, chaos and 
authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the “vampire” needed to be quieted.9 Thus, the notion of 
the “Western Balkans” was introduced for the first time in the EU official documents10 in 
order to denote the region that is no longer a synonym for conflict, but a symbol of peace, 
cooperation, and domination of “European values”. (Svilar, 2010, p. 512)
By virtue of symbolic geography, although there is no geographic Northern, Eastern or 
Southern Balkans, a new region has been “mentally mapped”. The EU placed the We-
stern Balkans in the situation “in-between”, neither here (EU) nor there (Balkans), not 
excluded but not included either, as a region with a “European perspective” which has 
the opportunity to detach itself from the “traditionally barbaric region”, but also region 
that is not yet “European”. The prospect of Western Balkans accession to the EU was 
represented as the only solution for avoiding instability and “retrograde politics of the 
past”. It is the right, if not the “duty” for the EU to make these “troubled” region “Euro-
pean”. As European Commissioner Johannes Hahn stated,
If we don’t actively export stability, security and opportunities, we are bound to import insta-
bility and insecurity (...) That brings me to the Western Balkans, our own “front-yard” if you 
will, or rather an enclave in the EU. This is where our policy of “exporting stability” remains 
particularly relevant. Our job is not done there (...) There is no strategic development alterna-
tive for the region” (...) But make no mistake: politics abhors a vacuum. If the EU were to get 
wobbly in its commitments in the Balkans, someone else could wrestle in more. (Hahn, 2017)
Does this mean that the representations of the Balkans changed at the beginning of 
the 21st century? At first glance, the label Western Balkans mitigates the balkanistic EU 
discourse. The “western” characteristics of the Balkans have a new, positive “Europe-
an” connotation, which is widely accepted by the countries of the region. The region is 
no longer the EU’s “backyard” but becomes the EU’s “front-yard”. Nevertheless, “Bal-
kanism has not disappeared, but has shifted, for the time being, from the center stage of 
politics” although it is “still with us, conveniently submerged but ready at hand”. (Todo-
rova, 2009, p. 192) In that manner, Jean-Claude Junker, the president of the European 
Commission declared that “this tragic European region needs a European perspective. 
Otherwise the old demons of the past will reawaken”. (Junker, 2014, p. 7)
9 Allusion to the title of the book how to quiet a vampire (kako upokojiti vampira) written by Yugoslav (Serbian) 
writer Borislav Pekić (1930-1992).
10  The label “Western Balkans“ appeared for the first time in the Austrian presidency conclusions of the EU 
(1998). It comprised Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija.
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On the other hand, the Western Balkans found itself in a liminal position. By accepting 
the idea of inferiority of the Balkans, they deny at the same time that they are part of it. 
Being “Europeanized” by the EU in the new imaginary region, countries of the region 
confirmed the “reality” of the balcanistic discourse: the Balkans is “truly” barbaric and 
non-European. (Svilar, 2010, pp. 516–517) EU membership is perceived as an affirma-
tion of a country’s “Europeanness”, while the “others” are perceived as primordial non- 
European Balkans. The Western Balkans became a “repository” of discursive patterns 
available to the countries of the region to produce the discourse of otherness through 
the dichotomy Europeanness/Balkanness. Therefore, Europeanization produces Balkani-
zation. At the same time, the region is placed “betwixt and between”. It tends to pass 
from ambiguousness by adapting to the EU values and principles. However, before its 
exit from liminality, the region must demonstrate “satisfactory conduct”, i.e. “prove” its 
Europeanness before joining the EU. After all, “European civilization was held responsible 
for even tiny improvements in Balkans civilization” (Todorova, 2009, p. 133).
CONCLuSION
The Balkans represented the significant Other in the process of discursively constructed 
identities of Western Europe and the EU. The Balkan identity was discursively construct-
ed as inferior to the EU, i.e. in terms of opposition. In the discursive process, the pow-
erful EU — Self imposed the values of its particularity i.e. its identity as the only valid, 
“normal”, devaluating at the same time the particularity of Balkan — Other. The power/
knowledge that fixed the identities of the two opposite entities was sustained by the 
stereotypical images of the Balkans as Other. This relation of superiority/inferiority com-
prises continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of the differences of the Balkans—
Other by the EU — Self. In the process of othering, neither Balkans nor Western Balkans 
succeed to detach themselves from the identity imposed by the EU. Having the ability 
to impose the constructed dominant representations and to exclude the alternatives, 
the Balkans and the Western Balkans are what the EU makes of them, i.e. marginalized, 
the stigmatized inferior Other. 
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